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Abstract: ​The paper reviews the foundational ideals that gave “Europe”,                   
an integration project with continental ambitions, its initial meaning or                   
identity. “Europe” meant reconciliation and peace, reconstruction and               
widespread prosperity, and the mitigation of nationalism through the                 
creation of supranational communities. A broad cultural consensus made                 
it easier to trust each other and work together. The enterprise received a                         
tacit approval from Europeans throughout the initial stages. More than 60                     
years and 20 member states later the project is under strain in the social,                           
economic, political and cultural fields. Today, as Europeans (now                 
continental citizens) experience not only the advantages, but also the                   
sacrifices of belonging to “Europe” (in the form of a Union), their                       
allegiance to, and indeed the identity of the whole project are in question.                         
I will submit that the original identity of “Europe” should be revived, and                         
revisited for it to evolve in response to the present challenges. If its future                           
identity is that of an intercultural, inclusive, flexible, and analogical polity,                     
Europe will be still worth fighting for. 
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Allegiance to “Europe” is more problematic than, say, commitment to a                     
nation state, due to the nature of the European polity. The EU cannot                         
claim to possess attributes that provoke strong (or at least significant)                     
identification from its citizens.​3 ​This is why the legal figure of European                       
citizenship—especially when one focuses on the affiliative​4 ​dimension of                 
citizenship—presents a most interesting case in the study of the                   
interactions between international and public law, between domestic and                 
transnational identities, and between allegiance to nation and to                 
community of nations. 
In this paper I will explore the ideals of the European project that                         
received a tacit allegiance from Europeans at the foundational stages. In                     
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the second section, I will mention some of the problems that the project                         
faces at the present, which have put in jeopardy the identity of “Europe”                         
(the EU today) and demand a more explicit allegiance from the now                       
European citizens, at a moment when that allegiance is wavering. In the                       
final part, I will suggest that a revival of the foundational ideals, revisited                         
according to the new challenges, could give Europe a renewed identity,                     
worth its citizens paying allegiance to. 
 
Original integration paradigms 
 
According to Joseph Weiler, the European Communities (which would                 
evolve into the EU) were created with three goals in mind: social                       
integration (reconciliation and peaceful coexistence); economic           
integration (reconstruction and widespread prosperity); and political             
integration (restraint of nationalism through supranational structures).​5             
These elements constituted the purpose or telos of integration, as can be                       
seen in the Schuman Declaration.​6 
Prosperity, the moderation of nationalism, and peace were, in Weiler’s                   
view, objectives with more than a purely utilitarian intent. They were                     
ideals: ​a set of values, which could captivate the imagination of                     
Europeans, mobilise broadly based political forces, and counteract the                 
powerful pull of nationalism.​7 ​Those ideals represented not just any                   
values, but ‘‘higher” ones: desiderata that were altruistic (not self-serving,                   
but implying a sacrifice), ethical (virtuous) and communitarian (needing                 
the cooperation of all). 
Underlying those three ideals or goals was a broad moral consensus                     
springing from shared—or at least to a certain extent compatible—                   
worldviews.​8 ​Because that cultural atmosphere was obvious to most, it                   
required little discussion or specification: it simply was assumed. At the                     
heart of such European culture of the 1950s were the religious tradition of                         
the Bible (Judeo-Christianity) ​9 ​and the secular tradition of the                 
Enlightenment.​10 ​These four characteristics appear as features qualifying               
the foundational high values or ideals in Table 1.​11 
 
Table 1 – Original ideals and their features 
 
Feature 
Ideal 
Desideratum  Altruistic  Ethical  Communitarian 
Social  Peace  Reconciliation  Forgiveness  Coexistence 
Economic  Prosperity  Equality  Solidarity  Common​ ​market 
Political  Unity  Supranationalism  Moderation  Co-sovereignty 
Culture  Basic moral consensus Bible/Enlightenment 
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The social ideal: security and ​pax europaea 
After a conflagration like the Second World War, the goal of peace could                         
have hardly surprised anyone. It was obvious that nobody wanted another                     
event like that. Europe could not afford it. However, Weiler believes that                       
the kind of peace that the founders of the European project had in mind                           
was more than a purely utilitarian goal: it possessed the features of an                         
ideal. It was a call not only to stop the violence, but also to forgive and to                                 
overcome hatred. ‘‘The Schuman notion of peace” in Weiler’s view,                   
‘‘resonates with and is evocative of the distinct discourse, imagery and                     
values of Christian love”, which was natural in that historical context and                       
given the personal backgrounds of such founding fathers as Adenauer, De                     
Gasperi, Monnet and Schuman himself. ​12 
Peace certainly was a desideratum. However, it contained as well an                     
altruistic element, an implied sacrifice beyond the appeasement mood of                   
the 1930s. It required therefore the exercise of virtues: for example                     
overcoming the desire for revenge and for the humiliation of the former                       
enemy. It was, finally, only attainable through an effort involving the                     
community of European nations—France and Germany first, then the Six,                   
and so on.​13 
The European economic ideal 
For Weiler the economic reconstruction of the devastated continent was                   
‘‘intimately connected with the notion of peace.”​14 ​Here the search for                     
prosperity contained an altruistic element, because prosperity was a                 
condition for peace. But mediating the utilitarian aspects of prosperity                   
was an idealistic, virtuous element, evident when contrasted with the                   
destruction and poverty of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World                       
War: the element of individual and social dignity. Under the                   
Enlightenment vision of the individual, ‘‘poverty resonates with the                 
embarrassment of dependence on others, with the humiliation bred by                   
helplessness, and with the degradation of a lack of autonomy”.​15 
There was indeed virtue in the pursuit of prosperity as a means to                         
promote the dignity of individuals, regions, nations, and Europeans as a                     
whole. Prosperity won through hard work and effort, as well as through                       
cooperation with other individuals and nations. The Community aimed at                   
reconstruction with a sense of collective responsibility. It ‘‘attempted to                   
constrain the unchecked search for economic prosperity by one Member                   
State at the expense of the others”.​16 ​Thus, the processes of liberalisation                       
of barriers and open markets to which the European project aspired were                       
conceived, at the same time, in a context of solidarity. 
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The European political ideal 
Weiler has called the third ideal of European integration                 
‘‘supranationalism”.​17 ​Political integration can be envisaged either as a                 
union or as a community. The community vision, on the one hand, affirms                         
‘‘the values of the liberal nation state by policing the boundaries against                       
abuse”. On the other hand it also ‘‘seeks to redefine the very notion of                           
boundaries of the state, between the nation and the state and within the                         
nation itself.”​18 ​The unity vision is liberal and federal (and can be utilitarian                         
as well); the community vision is communitarian and hybrid.​19 ​The unity                     
vision entails the end of supranationalism—that is, of checks on                   
national-statisms—because it creates a super-state.​20 ​The community             
vision advocates a stateless polity. ​21 
Supranational cooperation was from the beginning a desideratum: it                 
meant moderating the excesses of nationalism; or more precisely, those                   
of states trying to advance their ‘‘national” interest in the European arena.                       
It aimed at the creation of a transnational atmosphere where individual                     
nation states became linked to other national or subnational groups                   
across the European Communities, so that the main distinguishing                 
category between peoples ceased to be their sense of belonging to a                       
nation state. Supranationalism in this sense entails also an altruistic aim                     
for Europeans to see each other in terms that go beyond the usual                         
category of state- nationality. Weiler sees in this supranationalism an heir                     
to the Enlightenment in its privileging of the value of every human                       
individual, expressed for example in the liberal notion of human rights.​22                     
In addition, as in the case of the ideals of peace and prosperity,                         
supranationalism could not be attained by nation states separately: it                   
required the assent and collaboration of all of them. 
Even though the community vision dominated during the initial stages                   
of European integration, the project has more and more tended towards a                       
unity conception, especially after the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (which                   
created a the “European Union” and its citizenship), and even more with                       
the attempt ten years later to draft a European Constitution (which failed).                       
The EU today is far much more than an international organisation. But it                         
seems to face decided resistance (both from member states and from                     
citizens) in order to become a (super) state.​23 ​Thence the appropriateness                     
of remembering the community vision, and of revisiting it according to the                       
new circumstances. 
Culture: the basic moral consensus 
The shared worldview or “basic moral consensus”​24 ​that allowed                 
Europeans to start the project of integration was based on two main                       
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cultural sources often in conflict but not altogether incompatible with                   
each other: the Bible and the Enlightenment.​25 ​Actually, because of their                     
contrast, they served to keep a certain cultural balance in the European                       
communities as they included more and more countries. The role of the                       
Enlightenment or humanistic secularism is generally acknowledged as part                 
of the make-up of Europe in general, and of the EU in particular, with                           
roots that can be traced back to the French Revolution and the beginnings                         
of Modernity.​26 ​The role of Christianity, not only as a question of heritage                         
from medieval history, but as a specific and essential force propelling                     
European integration in the second half of the 20th century, seems to                       
have been less studied.​27 
In this section, we have seen how the social, economic and political                       
ideals of the European project were founded on core cultural values                     
provided respectively by Judeo-Christianity and the Enlightenment. ​28 ​This is                 
why, for Weiler, the project was successful both at the level of elites and at                             
a broader societal level. 
 
Midlife crisis: challenges today 
 
Against the expectations of detractors, sceptics and critics, the project has                     
been one of the greatest successes in the history of Europe.​29 ​However,                       
Europe today appears to be in a “midlife crisis”. ​30 ​Probably it is natural that                           
it should happen that way. After all, the EU now encompasses not two (or                           
six) countries, but 27.​31 ​Because of that, it faces new challenges. In the first                           
part of the paper, I briefly described the original objectives and the ideals                         
that set the European project in motion, gave it an identity, and made it                           
successful. ​32 ​In this second part I describe the challenges that today make                         
the integration process show some signs of exhaustion and the allegiance                     
of European citizens waver. 
Parallel societies 
Social integration is being challenged by the presence of new immigrants                     
and citizens of diverse cultural backgrounds. This is evident in the case of                         
at least two minorities already present in the EU: the Roma and Muslims.                         
For reasons of space I will mention recent situations related to the latter,                         
though the former is no less important. ​33 
In 2010 Thilo Sarrazin, then still a board member of the ​Bundesbank,                       
published ​Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel                     
setzen ​(Germany does away with itself: how our country is putting itself at                         
risk)​34​, a book signaling to the lack of integration of Muslims in Germany                         
(63% of whom are Turkish). ​35 ​The publication attracted the attention not                       
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only of political or intellectual elites but also ‘‘a mass following from the                         
population at large”​36​. 
Other signs are the increased popularity of far-right parties with anti-                     
immigration agendas in the Netherlands,​37 ​Sweden,​38 ​France,​39 ​Denmark,               
Austria, Hungary and Italy;​40 ​the debate about the ban on wearing the                       
Islamic veil in public, particularly in France and Belgium, and on the                       
construction of minarets in Swiss mosques.​41 ​In the background of these                     
debates stands the likely decrease in the whole of Europe’s population in                       
the near future, even after considering the effect of immigration.​42 
Economic fragmentation 
The idea that a transnational currency may be able to survive without a                         
state seemed plausible at least until the Greek crisis at the beginning of                         
2010.​43 ​Since then, economic integration has faced the possibility of                   
derailing, creating several blocks within an EU that run at different                     
speeds.​44 
Risks to the euro’s stability during the financial crisis have brought                     
proposals by the EU Commission to regulate markets more closely, but                     
also to tighten control over Member State’s finances.​45 ​Not everybody                   
agrees with this step because it implies that nation state governments                     
would have to give more sovereignty to Brussels. ​46 ​More importantly,                   
many citizens have concerns about the euro’s impact on their national                     
economies.​47 ​There are even fears that they are no longer well served by                         
the single market and that the EU needs to revive the objective of the                           
social market economy.​48 
Due largely to an impasse caused by a lack of leadership among the                         
politicians who could make a difference (see next section), the eurozone’s                     
peripheral difficulties became problems, and after months of ineffective                 
actions those problems evolved into a crisis that is threatening not only                       
the common currency but the whole European project itself. The latest                     
literature on the future of Europe seems everything but optimistic. ​49 
Political impasse 
Political integration is weakening under pressure from three forces that                   
pull the EU in different ways. Euro-statists want the process to continue                       
towards full union, the closest thing possible to a strong federal state that                         
provides, they believe, a more definite and therefore stable situation.​50                   
They would fall under Weiler’s ‘‘union vision” mentioned above.                 
Intergovernmentalists push for devolution of as many competences as                 
possible ceded in the past to Brussels. For them the process has already                         
gone too far. Finally, advocates of a supranational but stateless polity,                     
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those who favour Weiler’s ‘‘community vision”, see the present situation of                     
the political integration process not necessarily as an anomaly, but rather                     
as the most desirable and workable state of affairs that needs only to be                           
perfected.​51 
All of them agree—and this is a widespread perception among EU                     
citizens as well—that as a polity the EU lacks sufficient legitimacy. ​52 ​This                       
“democratic deficit” is one of the most intricate present challenges in the                       
political field. 
Cultural radicalisation 
As has been seen above, in parallel with traditions originating from the                       
Enlightenment—including liberalism and social democracy—which share           
a secularist worldview, other influences have shaped contemporary               
Europe too. A very important one is Judeo-Christianity, and not only                     
historically but also in the construction and evolution of European                   
integration. The 2003 debate about whether to mention God and religion                     
in the European constitution was not accidental,​53 ​but revealed a latent                     
challenge to the dominant cultural paradigm: ideological secularism.​54 
According to Casanova, secularist ideology “positively [differentiates]             
modern secular Europeans from ‘the religious other,’ either from                 
pre-modern religious Europeans or from contemporary non-European             
religious people”.​55 ​Secular ideological elites that see religion with                 
suspicion and as a threat to the public sphere​56 ​are likely to exacerbate the                           
problem of the encounter with Islam,​57 ​whose growing presence has to be                       
factured in on the European cultural landscape. 
The European enterprise, therefore, successful so far to a large extent,                     
is undergoing strains in all three areas: social, economic and political. The                       
cultural consensus at the foundation stages of the communities, allowed                   
Europeans to obviate debate about ideals, and focus instead on practical                     
issues. As Europe passes its 60, the situation has changed. There is no                         
longer a clear cultural consensus. Ideals and paradigms for integration                   
should be revisited if the European project is to survive. 
 
Reviving ideals, revisiting paradigms 
 
With Weiler, I would like to suggest that a renewed analysis of the ideals                           
of integration could explain not only why the process was so successful in                         
the past, but also what the constitutive elements, and the identity of the                         
European project were. That might in turn shed light on how the EU                         
should address the challenges it faces today in the social, economic and                       
political spheres. 
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Table 2 provides a synthesised vision of the ideals in their dynamic                       
dimension: 
 
Table 2 – Original ideals, present challenges, future possibilities 
 
Sphere 
Stage 
Social  Economic  Political  Cultural 
Original ideal  Peace  Prosperity  Supranationalism  Bible &  Enlightenment 
Present 
Challenge 
Parallel 
societies  Fragmentation  Impasse  Radicalisation 
Future 
possibility 
Intercultural 
blending  Flexibility  Analogical unity 
Inclusive 
public sphere 
 
 
Social blending: interculturalism 
In the social sphere, interculturalism would translate into mutual                 
openness and a certain degree of blending.​58 ​Bouchard & Taylor’s proposal                     
for Quebec,​59 ​Zamagni’s and Donati’s Italian perspective,​60 ​and               
Fornet-Betancourt and Beuchot Latin American point of view are                 
examples in that direction.​61 
In the interculturalist scenario the initially distant cultural positions,                 
through communication and exchange, slowly achieve degrees of               
blending, in a way that after some time they have created a new, richer                           
culture together—one that everybody can claim to have contributed to                   
building. Two prerequisites for intercultural dialogue are:             
acknowledgement that individuals and human groups (including the               
majority or recipient group in a country) are “cultural”—i.e. possessing                   
culture;​62 ​and communication with the aid of a “transcultural grammar”                   
based on a basic notion of equality among human beings. ​63 ​This                     
transcultural grammar, which Beuchot has pinned down to a certain                   
conception of the human rights,​64 ​could help create a new, blended                     
culture, common to all European citizens, and therefore capable of serving                     
as a source of meaning and cohesion to all of them. 
Perhaps a first step in order to start an open and sincere dialogue with                           
Muslims—and to ask the same from them—is the acknowledgement that                   
the sources of European political culture include the Enlightenment ​and                   
religion​. Realisation of religion’s influence in the political culture of                   
both—secular and religious Europeans—might, after all, work as a bridge                   
for reciprocal understanding, communication and harmonious           
integration.​65 ​In Davie’s words “Islam must adapt to Europe…but Europe                   
must also adapt to Islam.”​66 
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A second step could be for all those living permanently in Europe to                         
realise that they might have to be with each other for a long time. This                             
realisation should reinforce the view that dialogue is necessary. 
A third step, already sketched above, is the creation of new ways of                         
life— and political culture—together, as a result of productive dialogue.                   
Casanova, Beuchot, van Leeuwen and others, have suggested possible                 
avenues.​67 ​What those proposals have in common is the idea that respect                       
and tolerance are not enough: they are only the beginning. Social                     
integration will only happen through exchange and interaction among the                   
different cultural groups. And the result will be a new, richer, and                       
common culture. Dialogue goes beyond discourse, to new ways of life                     
together.​68 ​Table 3 presents these ideas in a schematic way: 
 
Table 3 – Conceptual location of interculturalism 
 
Theory  Monoculturalism  Multiculturalism  Interculturalism 
Tool  Assimilation  Tolerance  Exchange 
Situation  Alienation  Isolation  Integration 
Result  Homogenised society  Parallel societies  Blended society 
 
 
Flexible economic cooperation 
European integration in general and economic integration in particular                 
should also be conceived in a different way, adapted to the new situation                         
in which the European project finds itself today. As I have tried to show in                             
the first section, this project was not a purely economic arrangement                     
based on self-interest and otherwise ignorant or mindless of whom the                     
partners were. Economic cooperation was a tool, not the main goal. Even                       
in the EU as it is today—let alone one with more members—economic                       
cooperation is already problematic and governance very difficult. ​69 ​There                 
has been talk among European leaders about reforming the Treaty of                     
Lisbon to deal with indebted eurozone States in crisis (like Greece). ​70 ​In                       
face of this situation, Vivien Schmidt plausibly has advanced the idea of                       
differentiated cooperation, a “Europe à la carte.”​71 
Schmidt observes that in practice the EU does not always work in a                         
uniform and unanimous manner. She points out that there are different                     
conceptions of the EU—its identity—that cannot be easily reconciled. ​72 ​A                     
“Menu Europe”' may be in part a description of how the EU is developing                           
at least in certain areas, as well as a normative position on the possible                           
way ahead. After all, the European project started thanks to a sectoral                       
agreement of a small group of countries, for the joint production of coal                         
and steel: with time new fields of cooperation and countries were added                       
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to the original “menu.” Today, differentiated—or “flexible”—cooperation             
might appear as a somewhat chaotic avenue for the European project, but                       
it could bring new life to it, provided some changes in the paradigm of                           
political integration were considered, as we shall see next. ​73 
 
Analogical unity for the supranational polity 
Under conditions of social interculturalism and flexible economic               
integration, the EU regime should be conceived in alternative terms too,                     
corresponding to a stateless, supranational polity​74 ​that motivates an                 
allegiance weaker than, and subordinated to, the national kind.​75 ​Its source                     
of cohesion or unity could have a certain resemblance with the national                       
one as well, without being exactly similar, but only “analogical”. In order to                         
illustrate the idea of analogical unity I would like to bring up Joseph                         
Weiler’s Principle of Constitutional Tolerance (PCT). ​76 ​This principle is an                   
example, in the realm of constitutional law, of analogical unity, and it has                         
been already  at work throughout the history of European integration.​77 
In the European constitutional landscape, Weiler notes, “Community               
norms trump conflicting Member State norms.” This hierarchy however,                 
“is not rooted in a [top to bottom], but rather on a “bottom-to-top                         
hierarchy of authority and real power.” For Weiler this singularity shows                     
the ​Grundnorm ​of the European constitutional construct. The political                 
organisation of the EU in good part reflects this principle and defies the                         
normal premise of constitutionalism. 
Under the PCT, the member states accept the European constitutional                   
discipline not because they are subordinated to a federal state as part of                         
its constitutional demos. They accept it as “an autonomous voluntary act,                     
endlessly renewed on each occasion, of subordination,” in areas governed                   
by a European norm which is the aggregated expression of other political                       
communities. This “creates in itself a different type of political community,                     
one unique feature of which is that very willingness to accept a binding                         
discipline which is rooted in, and derives from a community of others.”​78 
The PCT reflects a peculiar polity and a sort of unity that is ​like ​the unity                               
of a federal state, but not exactly; it is partly similar and partly                         
different—it is “analogical.”​79 ​Europe is not a demos, but a collection of                       
demoi. The European demoi have in fact paid allegiance to the European                       
project as it has been, always as a community of peoples, never as ​a                           
people. ​A European polity based on this analogical unity is more likely to                         
stay together, but it is also more desirable because it respects the                       
autonomy of the parts, it is a real “unity in diversity”. If national diversity is                             
a treasure to Europe—in its languages, just to mention one                   
example—then analogical unity ought to be the way of keeping the polity                       
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together. 
Analogical unity, as the PCT shows, relies on something different to a                       
legal obligation. It presupposes willingness, in other words a free assent                     
to act even if there is no punishment (say, a fee) for not acting. Solidarity,                             
for example, cannot be dictated by law and presupposes such free assent.                       
This element of freedom and solidarity was very much present in the                       
foundational years, animated by the ideals that set in motion the                     
European community of states and peoples.​80 ​In a democratic polity                   
equality finds formal expression in citizenship and actual realisation in an                     
inclusive public sphere. To that we now turn. 
An inclusive public sphere 
In the second part of this paper we examined three very significant                       
sources informing the current political culture of Europe: the                 
Enlightenment, Christianity and Islam. Representatives of these streams               
have already contributed interesting ideas to the discussion of the place of                       
worldviews (secularism and religions included) in the public sphere.​81 ​In                   
comparison with the secular majority, Christians and Muslims in Europe                   
are minorities, and they know it. For all their long history of coexistence                         
and conflict,​82 ​they are in dialogue based on some common ground.​83 ​This,                       
says Davie, is not always obvious for “the secular elites,”​84 ​who face the                         
double challenge of recognising that the majority cultural stand ​is ​a                     
cultural stand, on the one hand; and that religious positions, including                     
Islam should be recognised, on the other.​85 
The way is certainly not easy, but neither is it impossible. History                       
provides evidence of intolerance and persecution on religious grounds,                 
under Christian, Muslim, or secularist regimes. ​86 ​The social blending at                   
which interculturalism aims (see above) is pursued in part through                   
dialogue that occurs in the public sphere.​87 ​Interesting ideas for an                     
inclusive public sphere have come from thinkers pertaining to diverse                   
cultural political traditions.​88 ​Due to lack of space here I will refer to only                           
one.​89 
Habermas distinguishes between “the normative demands of a liberal                 
order” and “the functional social imperatives of modernization”, which                 
among other things demands “the secularization of state authority.”​90                 
Secular citizens must adjust to a new situation, that of post-secular                     
societies, where religious communities continue to exist (i.e. did not                   
disappear according to the Modern myth). Secular and religious citizens                   
must learn to live in disagreement about certain issues with each other. ​91                       
This realisation must motivate citizens of either group not only to speak in                         
terms that the other may understand, but also to help those with a                         
11 
different worldview to “translate” their claims into a language understood                   
by all. 
In order for secular citizens not to become secularist (as for religious                       
citizens not to become fundamentalist), they must adopt a self-critical                   
view of the limits of secular reason (as religious citizens must be critical of                           
religion too).​92 ​Or in Ratzinger’s words, “religion must continually allow                   
itself to be purified and structured by reason,” while (secular) reason can                       
benefit as well from the enrichment of faith and religion.​93 
What interculturalism is for the social context, inclusiveness in the                   
public sphere is for the cultural realm. Even a supranational, stateless                     
polity needs a link among its members to keep it together. That link can be                             
strengthened through an inclusive public sphere, whose most prominent                 
outcome is a common political culture. 
 
Conclusion: allegiance and identity in evolution 
One of the theories about why dinosaurs became extinct relates these                     
formidable creatures’ incapacity to diversify before changing conditions. ​94               
The European project has been greatly successful so far, but whether it                       
can expect a better fate than that of dinosaurs in the face of the present                             
crisis is still an open question. Europe’s “ecosystem”, its local and global                       
environment, is changing rapidly. Europe must change too, and this time                     
with a much prominent participation from its citizens. Bringing to mind                     
the original ideals can illuminate ways to face the present challenges. But                       
the result will be altogether different. A Europe which evolves towards                     
intercultural social blending; flexible economic cooperation; analogical             
political unity; and a public sphere inclusive of the different cultural                     
streams that matter to its citizens today; such Europe will be worth                       
fighting for. 
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